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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the connection, established by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things, between the appearance of “man” as 
an anthropological presupposition of scientific and philosophical discourses, and the construction of a transcendental dispositif of 
thought. In accordance with this presupposition, the notion of life is conceived by Foucault as a by-product of Kantian modernity 
and inscribed within a Heideggerian ontotheology. By stressing the vitalist alternatives to this paradigm, the essay questions the 
hegemony of Western transcendentalism and proposes a naturalistic reorientation of Foucault’s intellectual project.
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El sueño Kantiano: en los límites del “efecto Foucault”
RESUMEN
Este artículo analiza la conexión establecida por Michael Focucault en The Order of Things (El orden de las cosas), entre la 
aparición del “hombre” como una presuposición antropológica de los discursos científico y antropológico, y la construcción de 
un dispositif trascendental del pensamiento.  De acuerdo con esta presuposición, la noción de vida es concebida por Foucault 
como un subproducto de la modernidad kantiana y está inscrita dentro de la ontoteología heideggeriana.  Al enfatizar las 
alternativas vitalistas de este paradigma, el ensayo cuestiona la hegemonía del trascendentalismo Occidental y propone una 
reorientación naturalista del proyecto intelectual de Foucault.  
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RESUMO
Este artigo analisa a conexão estabelecida por Michael Foucault em The Order of Things (As palavras e as coisas), entre o 
surgimento do “homem” como uma pressuposição antropológica dos discursos científico e antropológico, e a construção de 
um dispositif transcendental do pensamento. De acordo com essa pressuposição, a noção de vida é concebida por Foucault 
como um subproduto da modernidade kantiana e está inscrita dentro da ontologia heideggeriana. Ao enfatizar as alternativas 
vitalistas desse paradigma, o ensaio questiona a hegemonia do transcendentalismo ocidental e propõe uma reorientação 
naturalista do projeto intelectual de Foucault.
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In The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences,1 Michel Foucault devotes a few dense chapters to 
an inspired, and sometimes obscure, description of the 
“anthropological ‘quadrilateral’” (Foucault 1970, 342). 
His target is the emergence within Western modernity 
of an unquestionable, and mostly invisible, set of 
conditions of possibility; an “archaeological mutation” 
that has dominated both empirical knowledge and 
theoretical speculation up to Nietzsche’s laughter and 
announcement of the “end of man”.2 The anthropological 
quadrilateral coincides with what Foucault sees as the 
transcendental dispositif determining the regime of truth 
of Western modernity, and consists of four conditions:3 
1) the “analytic of finitude”, as the preeminence of limits 
set within man’s subjectivity and finite bodies and 
faculties; 2) the inscription of finitude in a “strange 
empirico-transcendental doublet”, in which man is 
the incarnated subject to whom all knowledge must be 
referred; 3) the “unthought”, as that Other, not-known, 
impersonal Outside, in which modern transcendental 
reflection is rooted; and 4) the “retreat and return of the 
origin” in a place that is already-given and therefore non-
original and non-foundational, in the always already 
begun background of the “quasi-transcendentals” of life, 
language and work.4 
1 Originally published in French with the title Les mots et les choses: Une 
archéologie des sciences humaines (Foucault 1966).
2 “It was Nietzsche, in any case, who burned for us, even before we 
were born, the intermingled promises of the dialectic and anthropol-
ogy” (Foucault 1970, 286).
3 The transcendental dispositif of Western modernity is presented in 
The Order of Things from a phenomenological and mostly Heideggerian 
perspective. Foucault’s “anthropological quadrilateral” follows lit-
erally Heidegger’s description of the “Kantian ground-laying” and 
anthropological turn of Western metaphysics, almost paraphras-
ing Heidegger’s arguments on finitude, the “breaking-open of the 
foundation” and the transcendental analytic of subjectivity (see 
Heidegger 1990). Although Foucault’s programmatic objective is 
to disperse the exemplarity of the philosophical field, challenging 
the autonomy of Kant’s three Critiques and locating transcendental-
ism outside philosophical discourse, I am convinced that in the em-
pirical works of Ricardo, Cuvier and Bopp (Le Blanc 2010), the silent 
coherence of Foucault’s “critical history of thought” depends on his 
overarching Heideggerian assumptions about the Kantian destiny of 
Western modernity.
4 “[...] [M]an is governed by labour, life, and language: his concrete 
existence finds its determinations in them [...] and he, as soon as he 
thinks, merely unveils himself to his own eyes in the form of a being 
who is already, in a necessarily subjacent density, in an irreducible 
According to Foucault, the anthropological quadrilate-
ral occupies the space disclosed by the Kantian critique, 
which “marks the threshold of our modernity” (Fou-
cault 1970, 242). At the end of the eighteenth century 
the system of Classical representation – i.e. pre-critical 
rationality and its set of disciplines: general grammar, 
natural history, the analysis of wealth – was shaken by 
an “essential displacement, which toppled the whole of 
Western thought” (Foucault 1970, 238). This “somewhat 
enigmatic event”, the dawn of Kantian modernity, was 
accompanied by “the withdrawal of knowledge and 
thought outside the space of representation” (Foucault 
1970, 242) and by the ruthless hegemony of a transcen-
dental paradigm, obsessed with the problem of the ori-
gin, foundation and limits of representation. After this 
event, the transcendental field became the terrain 
where the origin retreats in the unthought, the sou-
rce of man’s finitude, the invisible double that enfolds 
all empirical evidence. Kantianism assigns to man a 
functional and relational status, and therefore rein-
vents humanity as an “empirico-transcendental dou-
blet”, an architectural joint, a place at the crossroad of 
both the transcendental field and the new empirical 
fields. Labour, life and language are the new “histori-
cal transcendentals” that, through their articulation 
by political economy, biology and philology, direct the 
development of Western rationality and socio-politi-
cal organization: 
Labour, life and language appear as so many ‘transcen-
dentals’ which make possible the objective knowledge 
of living beings, of the laws of production, and of the 
forms of language. In their being they are outside 
knowledge, but by that very fact they are conditions 
of knowledge; they correspond to Kant’s discovery of a 
transcendental field [...] they totalize phenomena and 
express the a priori coherence of empirical multiplici-
ties (Foucault 1970, 244). 
Beyond the details of his analyses, the core of 
Foucault’s argument is the connection between the 
appearance of man as an anthropological presuppo-
sition of all scientific and philosophical discourses, 
and the unfolding of a transcendental tradition of 
thought, which runs from Kant to Heidegger. The in-
tersection of these two vectors (i.e. of Kant’s epistemo-
logical subjectivism and the anthropological turn that 
characterizes the human sciences) produces a unified 
anteriority, a living being, an instrument of production, a vehicle for 
words which exist before him” (Foucault 1970, 313).
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episteme, centered on man as an impure place of passa-
ge and relational device. Man and human subjectivity 
are at the same time the passive object and active sub-
ject of a mixed knowledge, which oscillates between 
the expressive borders of the Kantian age: ontology 
and positivism, promise and reduction, eschatology and 
empiricity. Transcendentalism for Foucault is therefo-
re much more than a historically determined philoso-
phical option, shared by Kant, the neo-Kantians, and 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Rather, it is the common 
destiny of Western modernity, a dispositif which is dis-
placed, transformed and yet continuously reaffirmed;5 
a self-referential apparatus that (thanks to a phantas-
mal duplication) depends on the empirical for its con-
dition of possibility and truth: “For the threshold of 
our modernity is situated not by the attempt to apply 
objective methods to the study of man, but rather by 
the constitution of an empirical-transcendental dou-
blet which was called man” (Foucault 1970, 319).6
Repeating Heidegger’s arguments from Kant and the Pro-
blem of Metaphysics (Heidegger 1990), Foucault sums up 
his vision of modernity. Kant adds to his traditional 
trilogy of questions an ultimate one, “the three critical 
questions (What can I know? What must I do? What 
am I permitted to hope?) then found themselves refe-
rred to a fourth, and inscribed, as it were, ‘to its ac-
count’: Was ist der Mensch?” (Foucault 1970, 341). Having 
overcome the ordered space of representation of Classi-
cal discourse, Western modernity finds itself trapped 
in a Kantian fold, a transcendental illusionism cente-
red on “anthropology as an analytic of man”. Foucault 
reasserts this idea with a memorable sentence, in the 
same year that The Order of Things is published: “the Kan-
tian enigma” has “stupefied Western thought, leaving 
it blind to its own modernity for nearly two hundred 
years” (Foucault 1994, 546).7
Becoming Nietzsche 
In the last pages of the chapter of The Orders of Things, in 
which Foucault confronts a Kant-driven modernity ab-
sorbed into the aporias of “man and his doubles”, the 
hegemony of the anthropological quadrilateral gives way 
5 For a critique of the trascendental dispositif, see Esposito (2010).
6 Among the many studies addressing the intricate relations of 
Foucault with Kant and Kantianism, see Fimiani (1997), Han (2002) 
and Le Blanc (2010). 
7 This is Foucault’s review of the French edition of Ernest Cassirer’s Die 
Philosophie der Aufklärung.
to the figure of an “anthropological sleep”. The Kantian 
critical awakening from dogmatic slumber becomes in 
Foucault a denunciation of the “anthropological configu-
ration” of the modern episteme: “All empirical knowledge, 
provided it concerns man, can serve as a possible philo-
sophical field in which the foundation of knowledge, 
the definition of its limits, and, in the end, the truth of 
all truth must be discoverable” (Foucault 1970, 341). The 
pathos and care shown by the human sciences’ attempt 
to define man as “a living being, an individual at work, 
or a speaking subject” is redirected by the “transcenden-
tal function” into a foundation of finitude. The “man of 
nature, of exchange, or discourse” is reduplicated into 
an analytic of limits and ontological structures. When 
Foucault declares that “Anthropology constitutes perhaps 
the fundamental arrangement that has governed and 
controlled the path of philosophical thought from Kant 
until our own day” (Foucault 1970, 342), his polemical ob-
jective is the incestuous cohabitation of the empirical 
and the critical, under the insignia of man’s humanity 
and its human and social sciences. The transcendental 
dispositif consists in this relational function inserted in the 
human; a mechanism of correlation that – from Kant’s 
schematism to Husserl’s intentionality, from Heidegger’s 
ontological difference to Deleuze’s theory of individua-
tion – has guaranteed the odd, flexible and polarized sta-
bility of Western empirico-critical humanity, the balance 
and coexistence of its positivism and mysticism, the ha-
llucinatory naturality of its synthesis of prophetism and 
economic-political reductionism.
In keeping with his acknowledgment, and accep-
tance, of the thorny destiny of Kantian modernity, 
Foucault apocalyptically predicts it being overcome, 
arguing that “there is no other way than to destroy 
the anthropological ‘quadrilateral’ in its very founda-
tions,” and points to the “Nietzschean experience” as 
the “first attempt at this uprooting of Anthropology” 
(Foucault 1970, 341). The Order of Things offers just a few 
scattered indications of what a non-Kantian episteme 
might look like, mentioning Nietzsche’s “philological 
critique” and “certain form of biologism”, his cham-
pioning of the “enigmatic multiplicity” of language, 
and his concentration on the who of discourse, on “the 
possessor of the word” (Foucault 1970). 
We know how, after the archaeological phase of The 
Order of Things, Foucault moves to a genealogical in-
quiry guided by a closer dialogue with Nietzsche.8 Pro-
8 See Foucault (1984b).




gressively, Foucault’s research turns into a redde rationem 
with Nietzsche, a “becoming Nietzsche” to such an 
extent that much of what we recognize as Foucaul-
dian, especially in the so-called “late Foucault” – the 
contingency of the origins, the connection of pouvoir 
and savoir, the genealogy of Western “will to truth”, 
the emergence and variation of specific techniques of 
power accompanied by forms of subjectification, the 
problematic of biopower and biopolitics, governmen-
tality and parrhesia, the care of the self – can be seen pri-
marily as polite declinations of Nietzsche’s destruction 
of the political, ethical, and conceptual legacy of Wes-
tern thought. Despite Foucault’s own attempt to mark 
the inner lines of continuity of his thought, it is evident 
that his early sympathy for modes of epistemological 
structuralism still heavily indebted to the transcenden-
tal paradigm9 is replaced by a growing Nietzschean hos-
tility towards this Kantian vocabulary.10 And yet, it is 
also well known that, up to his testamentary essay What 
is Enlightenment?, Foucault has never followed Nietzsche’s 
radicalism in his merciless scorn for Kant, always refu-
sing to cut the umbilical cord that connects him to Kant 
and the Enlightenment. The question of critique, the 
discourse on the limits of reason, and the heritage of 
modernity, have survived in Foucault alongside with his 
engagement with Nietzsche’s anti-philosophical con-
tempt for Western civilization.11
Since Foucault has disdainfully refused the “‘black-
mail of the Enlightenment”, the simplistic imputation 
9 “One might suggest that by virtue of Foucault’s very inscription 
within the modernity that he historically criticizes, he must be de-
fined as a post-Kantian” (Han 2002, 37). 
10 See, for instance, Foucault’s remarks on the heterogeneity between 
criticism and archaeology on one side, and transcendentalism on the 
other: “this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that 
of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and 
archaeological in its method. Archaeological - and not transcenden-
tal - in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal struc-
tures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to 
treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, 
and do as so many historical events [...]” (Foucault 1984a, 46).
11 “Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. 
[...] [I]t seems to me that a meaning can be attributed to that critical 
interrogation on the present and on ourselves which Kant formu-
lated by reflecting on the Enlightenment. It seems to me that Kant's 
reflection is even a way of philosophizing that has not been without 
its importance or effectiveness during the last two centuries. The 
critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, 
as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowl-
edge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an 
ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is 
at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that 
are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them” (Foucault 1984a).
of “being for or against the Enlightenment” (Foucault 
1984a, 45), it would be useless to introduce what we 
may call the “blackmail of Kant”, reducing his philoso-
phical position to a somewhat encapsulating and unre-
solved acceptance of Kantianism. More fruitful would 
be an interrogation of Foucault’s intricate and oxymo-
ronic relationship with both Kant and Nietzsche, with 
Western modernity and its inner and outer outsides 
(the genealogical unthought and the non-European 
geopolitical forces of displacement). How and why 
did Foucault tenaciously protect the double heritages 
of Kant and Nietzsche? What are the sources, impul-
ses and theoretico-political implications of Foucault’s 
combinatorial strategy? 
The most common answers to this conundrum mobilize 
the resources of philosophical historiography and refine 
the understanding of Foucault’s encounter with Kant 
and Nietzsche, emphasizing the seminal complexity and 
ambiguity of Foucault’s 1961 dissertation on Kant’s Prag-
matic Anthropology (Foucault 2008), his early engagement 
with anthropology and Kantianism,12 his dependence 
on the interpretations of transcendentalism offered 
by Jean Hyppolite and Jules Vuillemin; or underlining 
the overlappings and distinctions between critique 
and analysis, between different aspects of moderni-
ty, between an early and a late Foucault; or again fo-
cusing on the subtle mutations of his transcendental 
presumption and the continuous micro-variations of 
his Nietzscheanism and Kantianism. 
Thanks to the increasingly fine-tuned machinery 
of Foucault Studies, we are now aware of the key in-
fluence of Jules Vuillemin’s book L’Héritage kantien et la 
révolution copernicienne (1954) in shaping Foucault’s para-
digmatic synthesis of Kant and Nietzsche, mediated as 
it was by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.13 And, 
most importantly, we have grasped the extent of the 
hegemony of Heideggerianism in post-Second World 
War European philosophy, after the publication of 
12 Giuseppe Bianco has called attention to the significant role played by 
transcendentalism in Foucault’s early philosophical apprenticeship; 
see Bianco (2005), Jean Hyppolite, Jules Vuillemin et le devenir “foucauldien” de 
Foucault (unpublished essay). As early as 1949, Jean Hyppolite directed 
Foucault’s “mémoire de DES” on La constitution d’un transcendantal historique 
dans la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel (text lost or not available). On 
Foucault’s loyalty to a “constructed” lineage of French epistemology 
that runs from Bachelard to himself, through Canguilhem and in op-
position to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Bergson, see Foucault (1998). On 
this topic see also Bianco (2011). Many thanks to Giuseppe Bianco for 
allowing me to read his unpublished essays.
13 See Bianco (2005) y Sluga (2005).
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Heidegger’s Being and Event, the Letter on Humanism, his 
writing on Nietzsche and, in France, the 1953 transla-
tion of his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. 
What are the consequences of Foucault’s unyielding 
positioning within Heidegger’s history of Western me-
taphysics, within his ontological rewriting of Kant’s 
transcendentalism and Nietzsche’s nihilism, within 
his understanding of truth’s mechanism of “concealed-
ness” and “unconcealedness”?14 In the remaining pages 
I will take for granted a certain “Heideggerian sleep” of 
Foucault,15 concentrating exclusively on a crucial reper-
cussion of this epoch-making Heideggerianism, to show 
how a new reading of Foucault, but also of the most ad-
venturous European philosophy of the second half of the 
twentieth century, would benefit from its recognition.
A Life
What Foucault has inherited from his age – and mostly 
from French phenomenologically-oriented philoso-
phical historiography, which has been under the spell 
of Heidegger’s powerful reinvention of ontology – is a 
peculiar blindness, the impossibility to ascertain the 
radical alternative between transcendentalism (as the 
philosophical mainstream of modern Western philo-
sophy) and vitalism (as the principal challenge to this 
Kantian reign). This attitude, quite typical of post-Se-
cond World War European intellectuals, translates into 
a weakening of Nietzsche’s naturalism and a de facto re-
futation of Bergson’s vitalism, and includes a defense of 
philosophy’s cognitive autonomy against the anti-philo-
sophical inclinations of Nietzsche and Bergson. While 
Foucault’s influential teacher and mentor, George 
Canguilhem, eventually overcomes his own Kantia-
nism to champion a biological reduction of philosophy 
and Bergsonian naturalism (Bianco 2012), Foucault li-
mits his conversion to the theorization of bio-power, 
without however removing his anti-Bergsonian and 
anti-naturalistic bias. 
The example of  Deleuze is even more striking. If we look 
systematically at the ontological presuppositions of his 
14 See in particular Foucault’s last interview in 1982: “For me Heidegger 
has always been the essential philosopher. [...] My entire philosophi-
cal development was determined by my reading of Heidegger” 
(Foucault 1990, 250).
15 On this topic see Milchman and Rosenberg (2003). Deleuze speaks of “the 
necessary confrontation between Foucault and Heidegger” (Deleuze 1988, 108).
creative interpretations of Nietzsche and Bergson,16 we find 
the manufacturing of a seductive and yet paradoxical neo-
Kantian image for Kant’s primary opponents, a conceptual 
engineering that restyles Nietzsche and Bergson into onto-
logists of difference and “transcendental vitalism”.17 With 
Deleuze, Foucault’s empirico-transcendental doublet loses 
its anthropological traits and is replaced by an inhuman 
doublet, a “transcendental empiricism”, the life of a “spi-
ritual automaton” that presides over disjunctive syntheses 
and processes of individuation.18
Beyond the theoretical minutiae of Foucault’s and 
Deleuze’s conceptual virtuosity, the “Kantian sleep” pro-
longed by Heideggerian ontology and radicalized to its 
furthermost limits by the philosophies of difference and 
exteriority, requires a double-bind relationship not only 
with Kant and transcendentalism, but also with the En-
lightenment and the destiny of Western modernity; that 
is, the willingness to accept without reservation a com-
mon destiny and engrave it in the theoretical apparatus 
of the West.
We can see this strategic mouvement sur place at work insi-
de Kantianism and European philosophical modernity, 
also in some of the most significative readings of Fou-
cault. Let’s take as an example Canguilhem’s review of 
Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things. Here Canguilhem 
inscribes Foucault’s archaeology of the human sciences 
within the tasks of a “non-Kantian analytics”, defined 
by the “obligations” of “non-Kantianism” (Canguilhem 
2005, 92). And yet, just a few paragraphs after this sen-
tence, Canguilhem concludes his eulogy of Foucault’s 
book with a Kantian prophecy: “Les Mots et les choses 
might play for a future Kant, as yet unknown as such, 
the awakening role that Kant attributed to Hume. In 
such a case we would have skipped a step in the non 
repetitive reproduction of epistemic history by saying 
of this work that it is to the sciences of man what the 
Critique of Pure Reason was to the sciences of nature” 
(Canguilhem 2005, 93). 
In his monograph on Foucault, Deleuze is even more ex-
plicit, proposing a systematic interpretation of Foucault’s 
work as a neo-Kantian reinvention of transcendentalism:
16 See Deleuze (1991and 1983).
17 On Deleuze’s “transcendental vitalism” see Luisetti (2011). The process 
of Kantianization of Bergson is at work also in the most systematic 
study of Bergson’s anti-Kantianism; see Barthélemy-Madaule (1966). 
18 On Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism see Sauvagnargues (2010).




This research into conditions constitutes a sort of neo-
Kantianism unique to Foucault [...] [I]f there is any 
neo-Kantianism, it is because visibilities together with 
their conditions form a Receptivity, and statements 
together with their conditions form a Spontaneity. [...] 
Foucault’s diagrammaticism, that is to say the presen-
tation of pure relations between forces or the transmis-
sion of pure particular features, is therefore the analo-
gue of Kantian schematicism (Deleuze 1988, 60 and 82). 
A way out of this socio-cognitive deadlock that has nur-
tured and, at the same time, paralyzed the most so-
phisticated European philosophy of the last decades, 
requires the inaugural gesture of rescuing vitalism from 
the transcendental trap. The “philosophical characters” 
of Nietzsche and Bergson, with their uncompromised 
and systemic aversion to Kant, have pointed to the vi-
talist alternatives, introducing many tools for breaking 
the hegemony of transcendentalism and fragmenting 
the destiny of European modernity. Foucault’s and 
Deleuze’s mise en abyme of neo-Kantianism, their infini-
tization of the “Kantian sleep” into a permanent critique 
and a transcendental vitalism, has halted this movement 
of de-creation of the Western ontotheological heritage. 
The wild energy of Bergsonian and Nietzschean natura-
lisms, with their lines of flight away from the philoso-
phical foundations of Christian civilization, have been 
weakened by the re-absorption of life within the trans-
cendental apparatus.
We already know how The Order of Things encounters life at 
the beginning of modernity, discovering its status as a 
historical a priori, as a new conceptual possibility arising 
within Western transcendentalism (Tarizzo 2010). As a 
by-product of the empirical-transcendental machine, 
life (as Foucault understood it) possesses all the charac-
teristics of the Kantian episteme: it is a “synthetic notion” 
that replaces the taxonomic space of the Classical age 
(Foucault 1970, 269); it is a non-natural phenomenon 
endowed with an “enigmatic” and obscure vitality (the 
puzzling life of the quasi-transcendentals); it is a histo-
ricized nature, a kenosis of the transcendental (Foucault 
1970); it is a mysterious activity that penetrates the living, 
shaping it from within and yet preserving itself as a pure 
Outside, a source.19 Like Deleuze’s une vie, the “immanent 
life”, the “pure life” of the transcendental field (Deleuze 
2001), Foucault’s life is a transcendental hallucination. 
And yet, while Deleuze stresses its vital and creative 
19 “Life, on the confines of being, is what is exterior to it and also, at the 
same time, what manifests itself within it” (Foucault 1970, 273).
connotations, Foucault is fascinated by the nightmarish 
aspects of this disincarnated vitality, by the “disturbing 
and nocturnal powers” of its biological animality: “the 
animal appears as the bearer of that death to which it 
is, at the same time, subjected; it contains a perpetual 
devouring of life by life. It belongs to nature only at the 
price of containing within itself a nucleus of anti-natu-
re” (Foucault 1970, 277-278).20
Foucault’s account of life has surrendered to the deadly 
hug of transcendentalism. In The Order of Things, from 
the perspective of a unified Kantian episteme, Foucault 
overlaps transcendentalism and biologism, life as a re-
lational dispositif and vitalism, so that his conception 
of vitality falls back into a neo-Kantian Weltanschauung. 
And yet, the naturality of nature did not exhaust itself 
with Kant and the end of the Classical age. It was ca-
rried over, profoundly renovated from within, by the 
vitalist anti-Kantianisms of Bergson and Nietzsche, by 
the avant-gardes’ technological immanentism, by bio-
philosophical and Orientalist trends (Luisetti 2011). The 
anti-philosophical force of dispersion of Bergson’s and 
Nietzsche’s thought lies precisely in their non-belonging 
to the false dualism of Classical, representational natura-
lism, and modern, transcendental vitalism. The vitalist 
turn opposed by Nietzsche and Bergson to the transcen-
dental unconscious of the European episteme is not a lost 
chapter of the history of European Kantianism. It under-
mines the desire to belong to the fate of Western moder-
nity, exposing it to the multiplicity of its archaisms and 
geo-philosophical localisms. While the testamentary 
will of Foucault embraces the Kantian dialectic of auto-
nomy and heteronomy,21 the vitalist destruction of trans-
cendentalism unveils in the theoretical ethos of autonomy 
the disturbing afterlife of the West’s lost centrality.
A Theologian Success
In the present conjuncture the secret paradigmatic force 
of transcendentalism and Heideggerianism has begun 
to fade, making the theoretical projects of Foucault, 
Deleuze and European post-phenomenological philo-
sophy as a whole substantially indecipherable. The 
synthesis of Kant and Nietzsche, the convergence of 
Bergsonism and phenomenology, which was perceived 
as natural for the readers of Hyppolite and Heidegger, 
20 We may notice how this transcendental epistemology of life resonates 
with Agamben’s negative dialectic of “bare life”; see Agamben (1998).
21 In What is Enlightenment? Foucault asserts the virtue of “critique” as “a 
permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy” (Foucault 1984a, 44).
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of Vuillemin and Canguilhem, has now lost its obvious-
ness. Transcendental vitalism is now an exotic coin, no 
longer a spontaneous philosophical attitude.
The positive effect of this redistribution of philosophi-
cal attitudes is the resurfacing of the structural incom-
patibility between transcendentalism and vitalism. 
Nietzsche’s assault on Kant can now be reclaimed from 
the Heideggerian and neo-Heideggerian taming of vita-
lism, and restituted to its genetic conditions. First and 
foremost, Kantianism is in fact for Nietzsche a moral op-
tion, a continuation of Christianity and Romanticism, 
the recreation of “the moral instincts of Christianity”. 
Kant translates and upholds in the scholastic realm 
Rousseau’s “vindictive rancor”, his “self-contempt and 
heated vanity” (Nietzsche 1994, 62). A man of “moral fa-
naticism”, Kant had no eye “for the actuality of his time, 
e.g., Revolution” and was “untouched by Greek philoso-
phy” (Nietzsche 1994, 60).22
Since Kant has re-infused Christianity with a subtle 
“theologian blood”, Nietzsche’s violent assault on Kant’s 
transcendentalism is a fundamental step in his cam-
paign against European philosophical modernity: 
Germans understand me immediately when I say 
that philosophy has been corrupted by the theologian 
blood. The Protestant minister is the grandfather of 
German philosophy [...] Why did the world of Ger-
man scholars, three-quarters of whom are pastors’ 
and teachers’ sons, go into such fits of delights at the 
appearance of Kant – why were Germans so convinced 
(you can still find echoes of this conviction) that Kant 
marked a change for the better? [...] A hidden path to 
the old ideal lay open; the concept of a ‘true world’, 
the concept of morality as the essence of the world (– 
the two most vicious errors in existence!) were once 
again (thanks to an exceedingly canny scepticism), 
if not provable, then at least no longer refutable [...] 
Reality was made into ‘mere appearance’; a complete 
lie called ‘the world of being’ was made into a reality 
[...] Kant’s success is just a theologian success [...] 
Kant became an idiot, - And this was a contemporary 
of Goethe! This disaster of a spider passed for the Ger-
22 “Kant [...] a subterranean Christianity in his values; a dogmatist 
through and through, but ponderously sick of this inclination [...] 
not yet touched by the slightest breath of cosmopolitan taste and the 
beauty of antiquity – a delayer and mediator, nothing original [...] In 
the case of Kant, theological prejudice, his unconscious dogmatism, 
his moralistic perspective, were dominant, directing, commanding 
[...] Kant believes in the fact of knowledge: what he wants is a piece of 
naiveté: knowledge of knowledge!” (Nietzsche 1994, 64 and 286).
man philosopher, – and still does! [...] The instinct 
that is wrong about everything, anti-nature as ins-
tinct, German decadence as philosophy – this is Kant! 
– (Nietzsche 1994, 9).23
If we accept the Nietzschean and Bergsonian refuta-
tion of Kantian modernity, we might be able to extract 
from Foucault’s self-imposed alliance with criticism 
and European Enlightenment the seeds of a contempo-
rary form of non-transcendental thought. Are there, 
in the “Foucault effect”, any sparkles of an “affirmati-
ve biopolitics”?24 What vitalist antidotes can we detect 
in Foucauldianism if we decide to counter the “subte-
rranean Christianity” of Western philosophical mo-
dernity with an immanentistic reorientation?
The main vitalist assumption articulated by Foucault 
throughout his work concerns topology. As in Bergson, 
who grounds knowledge in action and contact, in a 
pragmatic of behavior and movements in life-spaces, 
the structuralist heritage is reframed by Foucault into 
a topological and formalist paradigm, where archives, 
diagrams, discursive formations and visibilities are dis-
tributed and altered, designing a space of stability and 
variation, of persistence and repetitions, of continuity 
and dispersion. The topological orientation of Foucault’s 
method, the complex space-time compounds that it ge-
nerates, have been noted and carefully reconstructed by 
Deleuze, for whom “Foucault’s general principle is that 
every form is a compound of relations between forces 
[...] every inside-space is topologically in contact with 
the outside-space, independent of distance and on the 
limits of a ‘living’” (Deleuze 1988, 124). However, in line 
with his transcendental vitalism, Deleuze’s final aim is 
to reinscribe Foucault’s horizontal mechanisms of trans-
formation within a post-phenomenological, vertical to-
pological thought, modeled on an eclectic assemblage of 
Kant’s schematism, Heidegger’s fold of Being, and Mer-
leau-Ponty’s ontology of flesh. Foucault’s vitalist topology 
is thus crushed by the gears of the transcendental dispositif 
23 Although expressed within the constraints of intellectual discourse, 
Bergson’s relentless confutation of Kant and Kantianism – in par-
ticular of Charles Bernard Renouvier’s “neo-criticism” – is the leit-
motif of his thought: “Kant est son adversaire de toujours; de l’Essai 
sur les données immédiates de la conscience  aux Deux sources de la morale et de 
la religion, Bergson est resté fidèle à lui-même dans cette animadver-
sation”, Preface by Vladimir Jankélévitch, in Barthélemy-Madaule 
(1966, 1); “Henri Bergson ne s’est pas montré moins sévère pour les 
successeurs immédiats de Kant, qu’il ne l’a été pour Kant lui-même” 
(Canguilhem 1968, 348).
24 On “affirmative biopolitics” see Esposito (2007 and 2008) and 
Campbell (2011).




by this secularized neo-Kantian repetition of Christian 
ontotheology.25
Conversely, I would argue that we should concentrate ins-
tead on the naturalistic implications of Foucault’s topologi-
cal turn. If life processes are not polarized between finitude 
and its ontological Outside, torn by the virtuality of the 
transcendental field and folded along the lines of Kantian 
self-affection, then we shall abandon the new a priori of neo-
Kantian reason – the Neuter, ontological Difference, the 
Outside, the Impersonal – and explore the immanent logic 
of action and thought-movements, the distributions and 
qualitative transformations of singularities, the intersec-
tions and differences of kind among vital forces, the quali-
ties and effects of borders and obstacles, the creativity and 
paradoxes of a life which has finally learned how to accept 
its puzzling naturality (Lewin 1936). Reversing Foucault’s 
understanding of Kant, we might say that topological vi-
talism abandons the notion of man’s autonomy and his 
ghostly Outsides, the transcendental hypostases in which 
humanity reflects its desires of permanence and its fears 
of dependence, seeking “mature adulthood” in the ack-
nowledgment that “the essence of the living thing is that, 
insofar as it is living, it is immediately present to itself” 
(Canguilhem 1994, 318).
The principles of multiplicity and localization, of chan-
ge and transformation, of exteriority and rarity must 
be untangled from the traces of neo-Kantianism and 
Heideggerianism, and fully restored to their vitalist force.26 
What happens for instance when we apply the criterion 
of localization to the very conditions of production, re-
levance and diffusion of European thought? What is 
the destiny of the residual forms of Western univer-
salism, of the negative ontologies of otherness and the 
25 “This is Foucault's major achievement: the conversion of phenomenol-
ogy into epistemology [...] in Heidegger, and then in Merleau-Ponty, 
the surpassing of intentionality tended towards Being, the fold of 
Being. From intentionality to the fold, from being to Being, from 
phenomenology to ontology [...] This is why we may believe that the 
analysis conducted by Foucault in the unpublished Les aveux de la chair 
in turn concerns the whole of the problem of the ‘fold’ (incarnation) 
when it stresses the Christian origins of flesh from the viewpoint of 
the history of sexuality” (Deleuze 1988, 109-110 and 149).
26 See The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1972), where Foucault pro-
vides the most comprehensive account of his immanentistic method. 
Against the interpretative strategies of interiorization, totalization 
and ontological foundation, Foucault sets out a new language for 
the topological analysis of “statements”. What matters for a vital-
ist archaeologist of knowledge are not ontological “events” – the 
Heideggerian Ereignis – or logical-taxonomical homogeneities and 
continuities, but the positions, capacity of circulation, transforma-
tions and forms of accumulation of what is there in its dispersion 
and singularity – what Foucault defines as “positivity”.
outside, of the neuter and the transcendental field? Can 
we translate Foucault’s critical “ontology of the present” 
into a non-Kantian topology of knowledge?27
During a conversation with Buddhist priests, recorded in 
a Japanese Zen temple in 1978, Foucault offered an instan-
ce of this approach, addressing the underlying geophilo-
sophical localization of his intellectual project: “Europe 
finds itself in a defined region of the world and in a defi-
ned period. That said, it presents the specificity of creating 
a universal category which categorises the modern world. 
Europe is the birth place of universality. In this sense, the 
crisis of European thought concerns the whole world. It 
is a crisis which influences different thoughts in all the 
countries of the world, as well as the general thought of 
the world [...] the crisis of Western thought, the crisis 
of the Western concept which is revolution, the crisis of 
the Western concept which is man and society. It is a crisis 
which concerns the entire world” (Foucault 1999, 113).
While most philosophical positions, at least in Europe 
and North America, programmatically deny the crisis of 
Western universalism, Foucault territorializes the “limi-
ted system of presences” of modernity’s hegemonic dis-
course formations (Foucault 1972, 119), denouncing the 
regressive connotations projected by the notions of man 
and society, by the threatening actuality of humanism: 
Humanism may not be universal but may be quite rela-
tive to a certain situation. What we call humanism has 
been used by the Marxists, liberals, Nazis, Catholics. 
[...] What I am afraid of about humanism is that it pre-
sents a certain form of our ethics as a universal model for 
any kind of freedom. I think that there are more secrets, 
more possible freedoms, and more inventions in our 
future than we can imagine in humanism as it is dog-
matically represented on every side of the political rain-
bow: the Left, the Center, the Right (Foucault 1988, 15).
This redefinition of Western reason can now be extended 
beyond the limits envisioned by Foucault, widened into 
a geophilosophical destruction of transcendentalism 
and pushed forward into an emancipative topological 
vitalism.28 As it turned out, lingering Eurocentrism pre-
vented Foucault from recognizing the local validity and 
27 In Pensiero vivente, Roberto Esposito addresses this question by radi-
calizing Foucault’s anti-transcendental motifs and reclaiming the 
naturalistic ground of Italian thought (Esposito 2010).
28 I see a significant convergence between the naturalistic de-transcendenta-
lization of Western philosophy and the current emergence of indigenous 
and shamanic ontologies; see Escobar (2010) and Viveiros de Castro (2009). 
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historical contingency of his own critique, the limits of 
his neo-Kantian dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy, 
freedom and necessity. It is our task to interrupt the 
Kantian sleep and place ourselves in our awake actuali-
ty, fulfilling the uncertain promise of The Order of Things, 
the “emergence of what may perhaps be the space of con-
temporary thought” (Foucault 1970, 286). 
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